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Abstract
It has long been recognized that the media play an essential role in government
accountability. However, even in the absence of censorship, the government may
inuence news content by maintaining a cozy relationship with the media. This
paper develops a model of democratic politics in which media capture is endogenous.
The model o¤ers insights into the features of the media market that determine the
ability of the government to exercise such capture and hence to inuence political
outcomes.
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1 Introduction
For over two centuries, political thinkers have recognized that the media play an essential
role in democracy. Thomas Je¤erson famously stated: The basis of our governments
being the opinion of the people, the very rst object should be to keep that right; and
were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers
or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the lat-
ter. But I should mean that every man should receive those papers and be capable of
reading them. (Je¤erson [18]) Je¤ersons views are enshrined in the First Amendment
of the US Constitution which  among other things  categorically prohibits Congress
from passing laws that abridge the freedom of the press. As countries around the world
transition from autocracy to more or less democratic forms of government, they tend to
a¢ rm press freedom in equally strong terms. For instance, the 1993 Constitution of the
Russian Federation (article 25.1) proclaims that: The freedom of the mass media shall
be guaranteed. Censorship shall be prohibited.
But is formal media freedom enough to guarantee the free press that Je¤erson envis-
aged? Russia is a case in point. Despite the lack of old-fashioned preemptive censorship,
the Russian media are gravely hindered in other ways (Freedom House [12]). All national
broadcasters are now owned by state-controlled companies. Most national newspapers
are in the hand of a small number of wealthy individuals who are vulnerable to political
pressure. It is no surprise that the Russian media provide a sympathetic and sometimes
incomplete account of government behavior. Freedom House reports a not-dissimilar com-
bination of formal press freedom and substantial political inuence in several other democ-
racies around the world, from Thailand to Italy, from India to Mexico. Since non-coercive
media capture is such a widespread phenomenon, development and politics scholars should
ask themselves what its determinants and consequences are.
This paper provides a simple theoretical framework to discuss how and when govern-
ment captures media and what a¤ect this has on political outcomes. Our starting point is
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a canonical political agency model (Barro [3], Ferejohn [10]). Voters use available informa-
tion to decide whether to keep the current party in power or replace it with the opposition.
The innovation of the present model is that information is provided endogenously by the
media industry.
Each media outlet faces two possible sources of prot commercial prot and prots
from collusion with government. The former are broadly audience-driven. They can take
the form of sales, subscriptions, advertising, depending on the specic medium under con-
sideration. Audiences increase if the media outlet reports interesting information. Prots
from collusion with government are various. At one extreme are direct monetary payments
(bribes) of the kind that were reputedly common in Peru during Alberto Fujimoris gov-
ernment.1 They could, however, take a more subtle and indirect form of inuence such as
an administrative decision or a legislative intervention that benets a rm controlled by
the media owner. For instance, until 2003 two of the top three Italian national newspapers
were controlled by the FIAT group, who could benet from a restriction on car imports
from Asia, a subsidy for new car purchases, or large investments in road construction
(relative to comparable countries).2
The extent of media capture through such means is endogenous in our model. This, in
turn, a¤ects the votersinformation and hence their voting decisions. This provides the
link between media capture and government accountability.
The paper begins with the simplest possible setting an exogenously given number of
media outlets, a homogenous electorate, and an exogenously given information gathering
1See McMillan and Zoido [20] for an interesting account of media corruption in Peru. Montesino insisted
on keeping detailed records, either written or videotaped, of his transactions with judges, politicians, and
the media. The amounts paid to the media were about one hundred times larger than those paid to
judges and politicians. On this basis, McMillan and Zoido argue that, by revealed preference, the media
exercised the strongest check on government.
2All three of those policies were indeed in place at various stages of the Italian post-war history. The
two newspapers, La Stampa and Corriere, have generally been regarded as pro-government or at least
non-adversarial, independent of the party in o¢ ce.
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technology. For this case, we show that:
1. Media pluralism provides e¤ective protection against capture. Even in the absence of
any horizontal di¤erentiation among media outlets, the existence of a large number
of independent media organizations make it less likely that the government controls
news provision in equilibrium. Every time the government pays an outlet to suppress
its information, the commercial revenue of the other outlets goes up because they
face less competition on the commercial side. If the government wants to buy out all
the media, it has to pay each of them as if it were a monopoly provider of unbiased
information.
2. Independent ownership reduces capture. While this is a commonly heard statement,
our model leads to a precise denition of independence. The degree of independence
of the media is given by the di¢ culty with which the state is able to transfer resources
to the media. The higher the transaction cost between the government and the media
industry, the less likely that in equilibrium the industry is captured. In the next
section, we will examine in more detail how our results on transaction costs can be
used to evaluate the e¤ect of di¤erent modes of ownership on media independence.
We also draw out implications for the optimal regulation of media ownership.
3. Media capture a¤ects political outcomes. Our retrospective voting model leads to
predictions on how government control of the news a¤ects the equilibrium features
of the political system. Media capture has two negative e¤ects on the utility of
voters. There is a moral hazard component: elected politicians are more likely to
engage in rent extraction in the knowledge that they are less likely to get caught.
There is also an adverse selection part: intrinsically bad politicians are less likely
to be identied and thus replaced. This sorting failure leads to a prediction on one
important observable: the presence of media capture reduces political turnover.
Putting together the three previous points, our model establishes a link between observ-
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able features of the media industry (concentration and ownership) and observable political
outcomes (capture, corruption, and turnover).
These conclusions are reached in an extremely stylized model. We complicate the analy-
sis in a number of directions to demonstrate both the robustness of the ndings and to
derive additional implications. There are four main complications. First, we study the im-
plications of moral hazard (rent extraction, corruption, etc...) as well as adverse selection.
We discuss why this yields a non-monotonic relationship between media independence and
the probability that the media reports bad news about the incumbent. Scandal-free coun-
tries have either an extremely independent media industry or an extremely pliable one.
Second, we discuss what happens when the entry into the media industry is endogenous,
i.e. potential entrants can become active by paying a xed cost. Reducing barriers to entry
in the media industry has a positive e¤ect on corruption, turnover, and media capture.
Third, we consider a model in which each outlet chooses how much to invest in monitoring
technology (e.g. the number of reporters). We demonstrate that in equilibrium the media
industry is vertically di¤erentiated, with a handful of high-quality media organizations
and a tailof outlets with low-monitoring ability. We show why in this world it is only
the high quality media that gets captured. Moreover, media investments in monitoring
are, in part, rewardedby the rents that they receive from government capture. Finally,
we consider explicitly the consequences of less crude forms of media capture other than
outright bribery such as rationing access to future news.
The current paper ts into an emerging literature on the role of the media in shaping
economic and political outcomes.3 For example, Besley and Burgess [5] discuss how
newspaper circulation in India is correlated with dispersion of food aid and calamity relief.
Stromberg [28] shows that New Deal spending across counties in the U.S. was correlated
with radio ownership. Djankov et al. [7] demonstrate how state ownership of the media
3Hamilton [17] provides an extensive and systematic discussion of the economics of mass media. See
also World Bank [29] for collected works on the role of the media in economic development.
5
is related to various measures of poor government performance. Gentzkow and Shapiro
[14] use data from nine predominantly Muslim countries to study the e¤ect of media
exposure on citizensattitudes towards the United States. Gentzkow [13] shows that the
development of broadcasting in the United States between 1960 and 1996 can explain 50%
of the decline in voter turnout in those years. Gentzkow, Glaeser, and Goldin [15] examine
the changes in the U.S. newspaper industry that occurred between 1870 and 1920 and
relate them to the reduction of corruption in US politics in the same period. Prat and
Stromberg [23] use panel evidence from Sweden to measure the e¤ect of the introduction
of commercial broadcasting on voter information and turnout. In a nonpolitical context,
Dyck and Zingales [8] present evidence consistent with a quid pro quo relationship between
newspapers and corporations.4
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline model and proves
the core results of the paper. It then discusses the link between the model and the facts.
Section 3 extends the baseline model in four directions. Finally, Section 4 concludes with
a look at potentially interesting research questions and policy issues.
2 The Baseline Model
The aim is to produce the simplest possible model to generate the main insights. The
model combines elections with a role for the media as information providers where capture
by government is possible.
We use a two-period retrospective voting model. In the rst period an incumbent is
exogenously in power. There are two possible types  2 fb; gg with Pr( = g) = , where
g stands for goodand b for bad. A good incumbent delivers a benet of one to voters
while a bad incumbent generates a payo¤ of zero. At the beginning of time, an incumbent
4Other authors (Groseclose [16] and Puglisi [24]) use news content analysis to measure the extent of
media bias.
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is selected who is good with probability . The baseline is a pure adverse-selection model
where the policy outcome is a function solely of the politicians type. The latter can be
interpreted either as intrinsic ability to produce public goods or as honesty where a
dishonest incumbent steals resources from voters.
To make the problem interesting, we suppose that voters do not observe their payo¤s at
the time of the re-election decision. This is reasonable if some of the incumbents policies
have long-term consequences such as with ghting a war or investing in infrastructure.
There are n active media outlets such as newspapers or TV stations. If the incumbent
is good, the media observe no veriable information. If the incumbent is bad, then with
probability q 2 [0; 1], they receive a veriable signal to this e¤ect. In practice, the pa-
rameter q depends on technological and cultural characteristics and also on institutional
variables such as the existence of censorship, the e¤ectiveness of libel laws, and the ex-
tent of privacy protection regulation. We assume that only veriable information can be
printed.
Implicit in this informational setup are three assumptions. First, news cannot be
fabricated. If we allowed the media to print uncorroborated news, and we wanted to
maintain the assumption that voters are rational, we would need to get into a complex
signalling game. Second, signals can only be bad. We could easily extend the model to
have both good and bad signals, as long as the probability of good signals is lower than
that of bad ones. Obviously, the incumbent would never want to suppress a good signal.5
Third, all media have the same information. This restriction is imposed for analytical
convenience and will be relaxed in the next section.
The nmedia outlets are identical and their payo¤depends on two components: audience-
related and policy-related revenues. The former revenues are important for for-prot media
(sales, subscriptions, advertising receipts, cable fees, etc..) but they may also be relevant
5The crucial assumption is that not having a signal increases the probability that the incumbent is
good. If this were not the case, a politician who manages to suppress bad information would still not be
re-elected, and media capture would not occur in equilibrium.
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for non-prot or state-owned media if their mission includes reaching as many viewers as
possible. Viewers prefer informative news. We assume that they divide themselves equally
among the media outlets that are reporting news. The audience-related revenue of an
outlet is normalized to zero if the outlet has no news and it is a
m
if it has news, where a
is a parameter that represents the maximum potential audience-related benet and m is
the number of outlets that are reporting news. If at least one outlet has informative news,
then all voters become informed.6
We allow incumbents to manipulate news. This is modeled as a bargaining game
between the media and the politician. Since news cannot be fabricated, the only strategy
available to politicians is to hide bad news. The bargaining game works as follows. The
incumbent can make each outlet i a non-negative monetary o¤er of ti. A media outlet that
accepts this o¤er suppresses his signal about the politicians type. O¤ers are simultaneous
and private: the o¤er made to outlet i is not observed by voters or by the other outlets.7
A transfer ti costs ti to the incumbent but yields ti to media outlet i. The parameter
 2 [0;1) is a transaction cost. The incumbent gets r  Pi2I ti if she is re-elected and
 Pi2I ti if she is not, where I is the set of media outlets who accept her o¤er.
Transfers in this setting can be interpreted in a wide sense. They range from direct
instruments such as the cash bribes documented by McMillan and Zoido [20] to more
subtle forms of inuence such as enacting regulation that benets rms owned by the
same company that owns the media outlet. The cost of a transfer for the incumbent may
be interpreted as the loss in terms of money, energy, or reputation that she has to incur to
6Neither of these specic assumptions is essential for the analysis. The functional form am is assumed to
get a simple closed-form solution, but the gist of the results depend only on the fact that audience-related
revenues are decreasing in m. A model where not all voters become informed is available in the Additional
Material section.
7The Appendix shows that the assumption that the incumbents o¤er is not observed by other outlets
is not crucial. If outlets are able to observe the o¤ers that the incumbent makes to other outlets, the
results go through as stated. See the discussion in footnote 24 on page 30.
8
generate that transfer. The variable  captures the existence of institutional transaction
costs between the incumbent and the media. Legislative constraints and the risk of judicial
prosecution may limit the channels through which the politicians can transfer funds to
media. In the case where  = 1; it is impossible for the policy maker to a¤ect the
revenues of the media.
We expect transactions costs to depend in reality on the form of media ownership.
State-owned media seem likely to have the lowest transaction costs (unless they have a
governance structure that guarantees actual independence such as quasi-independent news
organizations like the BBC). Privately owned media are most likely to receive benets if
their owners (families, trade unions, industrial groups, etc.) have homogeneous interests.
Cross-ownership of the media with other activities may be important too. For example,
a broadcaster with diverse business interests may receive transfers through policy choices
that are favorable to their non-media interests. We would expect independently-owned
media to be more expensive to inuence than media that are part of larger groups. Other
things being equal, widely held private media are the hardest to inuence. We might
also expect media to be more independent when owned by foreign nationals who are less
beholden to the government.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The incumbents type  2 fb; gg is realized (Pr( = g) = ). If  = g, media observe
no signal (s = ;). If  = b, media observe s = b with probability q and s = ;
otherwise. The incumbent observes the media signal and selects a transfer ti  0,
for each outlet i.
2. Media outlet i observes transfer ti and decides to accept or reject ti. If it accepts, it
reports s = ; and receives ti

. If it rejects, it reports the true signal.
3. Voters observe the signals reported by the media and vote for the incumbent or a
challenger of unknown type.
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Two further assumptions are implicit in this set-up. First, the incumbent knows
what signal the media have received. This is a useful simplication since it avoids an
asymmetry between the outlets and the incumbent. It is arguably quite natural given that
only veriable signals can be printed before making an o¤er the incumbent can always
ask the media to reveal their evidence. Second, the incumbent makes her o¤ers after the
signals are realized. If she made her o¤ers before, she would need to give each outlet qa for
certain instead of a with probability q. As everybody is risk neutral and the probability q
is given, there would be no di¤erence.
The equilibrium of the game has two components. The rst is the bargaining game
between the politician and the media. The second is the equilibrium in the election game.
The bargaining game determines whether the media is an e¤ective information provider
in equilibrium. In situations where the media receives a transfer in exchange for silence
we say that the media is captured, referring otherwise to the media being independent :
To model equilibrium in the media market, we focus attention on perfect Bayesian
equilibrium restricted to pure-strategy equilibria in which voters use undominated strate-
gies, i.e., always vote for the candidate they prefer. The equilibrium conditions for the
media to be captured are given in:8
Proposition 1 Equilibrium in the media market may be one of two kinds:
1. If n < r
a
, the media industry is captured each media outlet suppresses its informa-
tion in exchange for a bribe ti = a.
2. If n  r
a
, the media industry is independent each media outlet reports their infor-
mation truthfully to voters.
8All proofs are in the Appendix. There it is shown that there is a unique pure-strategy perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which voters do not use dominated strategies. The restriction to pure strategies excludes
coordination problems among broadcasters at stage 2. There may be mixed-strategy equilibria in which
broadcasters and the incumbent randomize at the bribing stage. The restriction to undominated strategies
avoids the well-known coordination problems among voters.
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Proof. See Appendix.
A key ratio according to this result is r=a the level of rent enjoyed by an incumbent
relative to the cost of silencing a media outlet. The Proposition says that media will be
free if there is a large enough group of outlets relative to this ratio. Hence, ceteris paribus,
media plurality is a good thing. Capture is most likely when rents from o¢ ce holding are
high. This is because the incumbent is willing to o¤er larger bribes to the media (other
things being equal) when there is a larger rent associated with political survival. A more
commercialized media (as measured by higher a) is a safeguard against media capture
since it is more costly for the government to silence the media.
To understand the equilibrium structure of bribes when the media is captured, observe
that, although the incumbent has all the bargaining power, it is not enough for her to
reimburse each broadcaster for his lost revenues  a
n
. In order to buy his silence, the
incumbent has to pay him the amount it would get if it were the only broadcaster to bring
news. A lower amount is not acceptable since the incumbent makes positive o¤ers only
if it knows that everybody is going to accept. Thus at least a has to be o¤ered to all
active broadcasters, making the total cost of suppressing information na. The incumbent
compares this with the forgone re-election benet r to determine whether suppressing the
media is a good idea. The media sector is therefore captured if n < r
a
. The model makes
precise why plurality in media ownership can serve as a guarantee of independence having
numerous outlets makes it harder for the incumbent to inuence the whole industry.
There are two political consequences of media activism in this simple set-up: e¤ects
on turnover and e¤ects on voter welfare. With captured media, bad politicians are never
identied as voters have no ability to screen good from bad politicians. Their expected
utility is therefore  the probability that a randomly selected politician yields a benet
of one  in both periods. Turnover dened as the probability that an incumbent is
replaced by a challenger is equal to zero (voters are indi¤erent between the incumbent
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and the challenger but they vote for the incumbent.)9
If the media industry is not captured, then a bad incumbent is found out with probabil-
ity q, in which case she is replaced with a challenger of unknown quality. Votersexpected
utility is  in the rst term and  + q(1   ) in the second term and turnover is now
q(1  ). Thus, in an equilibrium without captured media, turnover among politicians is
higher than under captured media. It is also clear in this simple setting that voter welfare
is higher.
Also, if we let A be the sum of expected audience-related revenues for all outlets, we
have that A = qa when media are free and A = 0 when media are captured. A by-product
of capture is that the media industry alienates viewers by producing uninformative political
news.
The next result maps this nding into the underlying parameters that determine
whether media is free.
Proposition 2 Turnover of politicians, voter welfare, and total audience-related revenues
are non-decreasing in q, n, a, and  .
Proof. See Appendix.
These e¤ects come through two distinct channels. Greater media independence (high
), media commercialization (high a) and plurality (high n) inuence whether or not the
media is captured. Political transparency and e¢ cient news production (high q) is valuable
in societies with non-captured media, but does not directly inuence media capture.
9If they voted for the challenger, a bad incumbent would have no incentive to buy o¤ the media and
the media will be informative, in which case the lack of signal would be a good signal. Thus, there
cannot exist a pure-strategy equilibrium in which when there is no signal voters elect for the challenger
for sure. A mixed-strategy equilibrium could exist in which when s = 0 voters kick out the incumbent
with positive probability. However, this equilibrium requires that information is completely suppressed
(otherwise voters strictly prefer the incumbent). Hence, this equilibrium is analogous to the equilibrium
with capture.
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While only suggestive, our results are consistent with some rudimentary facts gleaned
from cross-sectional data. Ahrend [1] and Brunetti and Weder [6], for example, observe
that there is a cross-country link between corruption and press freedom as measured by
Freedom House. The latter measures in part the extent of media capture.10 To the extent
that corruption is symptomatic of bad politicians being in o¢ ce, our model is consistent
with this nding.
Two further ndings using data from Djankov et al. [7] are presented in Table 1. The
table shows that corruption levels and tenure in o¢ ce of political leaders is correlated with
elements of media ownership, specically the extent of state ownership and concentration
in the ownership of newspapers. State ownership in this context can be interpreted
as lowering transactions costs  . In columns (1)-(3), we compare the average number
of years in o¢ ce of the chief executive (typically President or Prime Minister) among
countries with low and high state ownership of newspapers. High state ownership (more
than 30% market share weighted) is associated with 7.21 years of increased tenure by the
chief executive and the di¤erence is strongly signicant. This e¤ect is equivalent to
a one standard deviation increase in political longevity. State ownership of newspapers
is also associated with a higher level of corruption, again with a signicantly higher level
for the countries with state ownership. To put this in perspective, an increase of 1
measured on the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 1 through 6 scale is equivalent
to the di¤erence between the score given to Peru and the United States. A similar set
of ndings for concentration in ownership is found in columns (4)-(6). Turnover is lower
and corruption higher in countries with more concentrated media ownership. While such
evidence crude and cannot be interpreted causally, it is encouraging that these facts are
consistent with Propositions 1 and 2.
10For example, three key components of the freedom house index concern the exercise of legal, political
and economic inuence over the media.
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3 Extensions
We now explore a variety of extensions which assess the robustness of the results above
and provide further insights.
3.1 Moral Hazard
Suppose now that the incumbent can choose how much rent extraction to engage in and
that the probability that she is caught when doing so is increasing in the amount of rent
that she consumes and the intensity of media activity. In this case the media can have
a direct benet to voters by curbing rent extraction. At the same time, this increase in
honesty by politicians will tend to make screening good from bad politicians more di¢ cult.
Formally, let the amount of rent that the incumbent appropriates be y 2 [0; 1]. The
remainder, 1 y, goes to voters. As before, there are two types of incumbents. Type g has
zero (or negative) benet from rent and thus always chooses y = 0. Type b has a linear
benet from rent (and for simplicity we assume she has no re-election motive except the
desire to get rent in the second term). The probability of detection now depends upon
both q and y. The more the incumbent appropriates, the easier it is for the media to
catch her. Let 	(y)q be the probability of detection given y. We assume that 	0  0,
	00 > 0, 	(0) = 0, 	0(0) = 0, 	(1) = 1, and limy!1	0(y) =1. As before, q 2 [0; 1].11 To
illustrate these issues, we suppose that at least one media outlet is active and that there
is no media capture.12
11As usual, a political accountability model with moral hazard and adverse selection has several inter-
pretations. In the one we use, we interpret  is honesty and y is rent. However,  could be disutility of
e¤ort and y could be e¤ort (the good type has no disutility for e¤ort), or  could be the degree to which
the incumbents policy preferences are similar to the votersand y the policy enacted (a bad politician is
one with di¤erent tastes, who tries to introduce policies that voters do not like).
12A full-edged model with moral hazard and the possibility of corrupt media is available from the
authors on request.
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It is obvious that a good incumbent chooses y = 0 in both terms. A bad incumbent ap-
propriates y = 1 in the second term. Thus, the utility for a bad type from being re-elected
is 1 while the voters receive zero. In the rst term, for a given q, a bad incumbents rent
extraction decision solves maxy fy + 1 	(y)qg. This yields an optimal rent extraction
level y^ satisfying
	0(y^)q = 1;
where the left-hand side is the marginal cost of rent extraction due to a higher probability
of detection and the right-hand side is the marginal benet of extra rent. It is now easy
to check that
dy^
dq
=   	
0(y^)
	00(y^)q
< 0:
Naturally enough, greater media activism reduces rent appropriation by politicians.
The presence of moral hazard makes the e¤ect of active media on turnover ambiguous.
To see this, rst observe that turnover is now (q) = 	(y^(q))q(1   ). As q increases,
there are two e¤ects. Holding rent extraction xed, active media are more likely to detect
rent appropriation as in the pure adverse selection model. This is the screening e¤ect of
active media. However, there is also an e¤ect due to reductions in y more active media
leads politicians to extract less from voters and makes it less likely that a bad incumbent
is detected and removed from o¢ ce. This is the discipline e¤ect of media activity. This
ambiguity can be seen analytically by observing that the sign of
0(q) =

	(y^) + 	0(y^)q
dby
dq

(1  )
cannot be determined in a general way.
To summarize, turnover is lower (higher) with increased monitoring if the discipline
e¤ect is more (less) important than the screening e¤ect. While it is not possible make
sharp predictions unless specic functional forms are assumed, we would expect turnover
to be decreasing in monitoring only for high levels of q. This is because, if q starts at a
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low level, an increase in it causes a large screening e¤ect. Indeed, one can show that for a
q that tends to zero turnover must be increasing.13
Even though e¤ects on turnover are ambiguous, voter welfare is still higher from media
activism. To see this, observe that expected voter welfare is
W (q) = 2 + (1  ) [1  by +	(y^)q] :
The rst term refers to the case where a good incumbent is elected in period one and is
returned to power for sure since no rent seeking is ever detected. The second term refers
to electing a bad incumbent who will extract by and be caught with probability 	(y^)q,
being replaced by a good incumbent with probability .
It is important to observe that a positive level of rent seeking by bad incumbents may
be desirable to voters. This is because (in this model) rent-seeking is the only device for
screening politicians. However, equilibrium rent seeking always exceeds the level desired
by voters. This makes greater media activism valuable on the margin.14
The same argument for why voter welfare is increasing in q implies that expected rents
13To show that limq!0+ (0) = 0 and limq!0+ 0(0) > 0, observe that limq!0+ (q) =
limq!0+ 	(y^(q))q(1 ) = 0 and limq!0+ y^(q) = 1. Obviously, it cannot be the case that limq!0+ 0(0) < 0.
however we can also exclude that limq!0+ 0(0) = 0 as follows:
lim
q!0+
0(q) =
 
1  lim
q!0+
(	0(y^(q)))2
	00(y^(q))
!
(1  ) = (1  0) (1  ) > 0:
A simple functional form is: 	(y) = 1  
p
1  y2. In this instance, a bad incumbent chooses y^(q) =
1p
1+q2
, and turnover is
(q) = (1  )
 
1 
s
q2
1 + q2
!
q
It is now easy to check that for high enough q this has a negative slope in q.
14To see this, note that the marginal benet of rent to a voter is 	0(y^)q while the marginal cost is
1. The incumbent sets 	0(y^)q = 1 implying that the marginal cost must exceed the marginal benet.
Hence, the voter will always prefer a lower y at the margin.
A more formal proof is available in the Appendix.
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are decreasing in media activity. To see this, observe that rents can be written as:
R (q) = (1  ) [1 + y^  	(y^)q] :
The incumbent always chooses a rent level below the expected rent maximizing level as
he cares only about being re-elected himself rather than the total rents extracted from
voters (by him and other bad incumbents). In general this makes him more cautious in
rent seeking than rent maximization would imply. An increase in q accentuates this e¤ect
(through the discipline e¤ect) as well as reducing rents via the screening e¤ect.
Putting this discussion together, we have:
Proposition 3 Suppose that there is both moral hazard and adverse selection. Then,
the e¤ect of media activity, as measured by q; has an ambiguous e¤ect on turnover of
incumbents. Voter welfare is increasing in q and expected rents are decreasing in q.
This shows that results derived earlier are robust to incorporating moral hazard into
the analysis. Voters prefer a more active media and rent appropriation is lower. This
extension does, however, suggest that the relationship between turnover and media activity
need not be monotonic.15
3.2 Endogenous Media Entry
The model is as in the baseline case except that the number of media outlets is now
endogenous.16 We suppose that there is a large number of potential media outlets each of
15One could even go one step further by endogenizing the entry choice of politicians. A good politician
receives a xed ego rent, while a bad politician benets from the rent he appropriates. Then, an increase
in q decreases the expected benet of a bad type but does not change the incentive of a good one. We
should then expect the pool of potential candidates to improve, that is, the ratio  should increase. This
self-selection e¤ect amplies the positive consequences of an increase in monitoring activity.
16The assumption that there is no entry is perhaps less unrealistic for television compared to newspapers.
The most common form of broadcasting is aerial television. At present, only in a handful of countries
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which can become active by paying a xed cost of c. The latter can be thought of, for
example, as the cost of hiring journalists, getting the appropriate technology and securing
all the necessary authorizations.
The timing of the game is modied by adding a prior stage 0 in which each of the
potential media outlets choose whether or not to enter. The entry decisions are made
simultaneously and non-cooperatively. The rest of the game is as before. In particular,
the outlets that have paid c receive an informative signal with probability q. We assume
that qa > c, so at least one outlet will nd it protable to enter.
As before, we focus on pure-strategy equilibria.17 This yields the following result
describing when the media is captured:
Proposition 4 Equilibrium in the media market may be one of two kinds:
1. If mod
 
qa
c

> r
a
, the media industry is independent. The number of active media
outlets is m = mod
 
qa
c

.
2. If mod
 
qa
c

< r
a
, the media industry is captured. The number of active media outlets
is m = mod
 
r
a

.
Whether or not the media is free is now determined by comparing two ratios: r
a
and qa
c
. The former is the maximum number of media the incumbent is willing to pay
o¤, as in Proposition 1. The latter is the equilibrium number of entrants (disregarding
integer constraints) under the assumption that the media industry is independent: it is
derived from condition that equates the marginal revenue of the mth outlet that enters
(like the US) other forms of broadcasting such as cable or satellite are more widespread. Aerial television
presents great barriers to entry, both technological because a network of transmitters is needed and
administrative because a broadcasting license is needed. As a consequence, many countries, including
several well-established market-oriented democracies, have been characterized by a small, and extremely
stable, set of broadcasting organizations.
17This excludes the possibility of coordination failures at the entry stage.
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(qa
m
) with its marginal cost (c). The last outlet that enters is then m = mod
 
qa
c

. If this
number is greater than the number of maximum number of outlets that the incumbent
is willing to pay o¤, then the media industry is free. If the media industry is free, the
number of outlets is then mod
 
qa
c

. If, however, the industry is captured, the number is
mod
 
r
a
  mod   qa
c

. This is because, in a captured industry the marginal revenue of the
mth entrant is a as long as m  mod   r
a

.
In the baseline model we found that media plurality was an e¤ective defense against
capture. This result still holds with free entry, except that now plurality is a consequence
of entry costs. The greater are barriers to entry, the more likely it is that the incumbent
captures the media. It is straightforward to see from from Proposition 2 that an increase
in the entry cost reduces political turnover and voter welfare.
From a practical standpoint, this extension shows why barriers to entry in the media
market lead to more capture and worse political outcomes. This explains why restrictive
entry policies in the media market, such as limits on foreign ownership, can have unfavor-
able consequences beyond the standard welfare losses that arise in standard markets.
3.3 Endogenous Monitoring
We now suppose that media quality is determined by investment decisions. We do so by
assuming that the di¢ culty of detecting a bad type is a random variable. Sometimes a
minimal amount of information gathering is enough. On other occasions, it is necessary to
have su¢ cient resources in place to launch a journalistic investigation. Each media outlet
chooses its monitoring capacity. We show that this set up will result in an equilibrium
in which media outlets are vertically di¤erentiated in terms of quality. This implies that
media capture is now stochastic and dependent ex ante on the resources that are put into
monitoring.
Formally, suppose that each media outlet can improve its monitoring ability by hiring
talented journalists and/or providing them with better resources. Hence, outlet i selects
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q 2 [0; 1] at cost of c(q), where c () is increasing, convex, and twice di¤erentiable.18 There
is a large group n of media entrants who, at stage 0, select their monitoring investments
simultaneously and non-cooperatively. The di¢ culty of detecting the incumbents type ex
post is determined by the realization of a random variable , which is uniformly distributed
on the unit interval. An outlet with detection e¤ort qi receives veriable information that
an incumbent is bad if   qi. The rest of the game is as in the baseline model. We now
characterize the equilibrium vector of quality investments and the probability of media
capture.
The number of informed media outlets depends on the realization of . The incumbent
will still want to buy o¤ either all informed media outlets or none of them. In equilibrium
the cost of buying o¤ one broadcaster is a. If m is the number of informed media, then
the incumbent chooses to bribe them if and only if r  ma. This denes a maximum
number of broadcasters M = mod
 
r
a

that the politician is willing to pay o¤. If more
thanM broadcasters turn out to be informed, then the incumbent gives up and the media
is not captured.
Without loss of generality, broadcasters can be indexed in order of decreasing technol-
ogy, so that q1  q2      qn. The incumbent bribes the media if and only if  > qM+1.
There are thus three cases according to the realization of . If  > q1, no broadcaster
is informed and the incumbent gets re-elected. If qM+1 <   q1, informed media are
captured and the incumbent is also re-elected. Finally if,   qM+1, the media is not
captured and the incumbent is removed from o¢ ce.
In equilibrium, broadcasters fall into two categories. Those with q > qM+1 are po-
tentially captured, i.e. have a positive probability of being bought o¤ by government.
Those with q  qM+1 are always not captured and compete only for audience share. The
equilibrium choices of q are thus as follows:
Lemma 5 Let M = mod
 
r
a

and let q^(k) be the unique q such that c0(q) = a
k
. In
18Corner solutions are avoided if we also assume that c(0) = c0(0) = 0 and limq!1 c0(q) =1.
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equilibrium, q1 =    = qM = q^(1) and, for every i  M + 1, qi = q^(i). A bad incumbent
is removed from o¢ ce with probability q^(M + 1).
The proposition describes a pure-strategy equilibrium which is unique up to a renum-
bering of media outlets. The choice of monitoring investment is determined by equating
the marginal cost to the marginal revenue. If an outlet belongs to the potentially captured
group, its marginal revenue is given by the monopoly prot of being bought o¤ by the
incumbent which is equal to a. If outlet i belongs to the low q ( qM+1) group of media,
its marginal revenue is audience-related and depends on how many outlets are printing
news. It is equal, therefore, to a
i
.19
Improved media e¢ ciency can now be modeled as a fall in the cost of investing in
monitoring. Thus, let c (q) = C (q), where  is a positive number and the function C ()
has the regularity properties discussed above. The parameter  can be interpreted as the
ease with which the media can make investments in quality, perhaps reecting the degree
of transparency in the operation of government.
Voter welfare and turnover are determined by the probability that a bad incumbent is
not re-elected: q^(M + 1), which by Lemma 5 is implicitly dened by
C 0(q) =
a
mod
 
r
a

+ 1
.
This shows that C 0(q^(M +1)) is non-decreasing in a and  ; and non-increasing in . Note
that an increase in a has two e¤ects, both positive: it increases the incentives for media
to buy better monitoring technology and it increases the cost for the incumbent of buying
o¤ the media. As C 0(q) is increasing in q, we have:
Proposition 6 Suppose the media choose their monitoring level endogenously. Turnover
and voter welfare are non-decreasing in a and  , and non-increasing in .
19The proof of the lemma checks that (in this highly discontinuous problem) these intuitive rst-order
conditions are indeed su¢ cient for a pure-strategy equilibrium.
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The model with endogenous monitoring has an important practical implication. Sup-
pose we compare two countries that are otherwise identical but one has an institutional
environment that is more conducive to capture (lower a or  , or higher ). The latter
country will have a media industry that is less vertically di¤erentiated. It will have a
larger number of outlets that are captured with positive probability in equilibrium (theM
of Lemma 5), which all have the same monitoring ability q^(1). The intuition is simple. The
marginal revenue of capture does not depend on the number of captured outlets, while the
marginal commercial revenue is decreasing in the number of informative outlets. Hence, a
captured media industry has less incentive to vertically di¤erentiate itself.
In this respect, it is interesting to note that two of the countries with the oldest tradition
of media freedomthe US and the UKare also characterized by a strong degree of vertical
di¤erentiation A small number of titles (such as the New York Times and the Wall Street
Journal in the US, or a hierarchy of broadsheetsin the UK) command high respect and
high prices, while a long lower tail (local newspapers in the US and tabloids in the UK)
of low-quality dailies are given away almost for free. Our theory interprets this extreme
vertical heterogeneity as a healthy sign that the press of these two countries is working
for the audience rather than for the government. A much more worrying situation can be
encountered in a country like Italy, which has traditionally lacked both the high-quality
titles willing to engage in high-prole investigative journalism and the long lower tail which
still constitutes a barrier to complete political capture.
3.4 Bribing as Access
In democracies with a well-established system of checks and balances, the government may
nd it di¢ cult to make cash transfers to the media or to adopt policies that are blatantly
biased in favor of a media company. However, it can still try to inuence the media by
o¤ering selective access to politicians to friendly media outlets. For instance, the Prime
Minister or President can grant an exclusive interview to one particular newspaper or
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television channel. If this is of interest to the public, then it increases the commercial
revenues of the chosen outlet. We now investigate whether our core results are sensitive
to modeling inuence in this way.20
We make one change to the basic model. The government cannot make monetary
transfers ti but it can promise outlet i an interview denoted by Ii 2 f0; 1g, where 1
indicates that an interview is granted if outlet i keeps quiet about embarrassing news.
We assume that the commercial value of such an interview is decreasing in the number of
outlets that have been granted the interview. Let m^ be the number of outlets that enjoy
selective access the additional prot deriving from the interview is  (m^) which is strictly
decreasing in m^. We assume that granting interviews is not costly to the government.21
It is now straightforward to see that the government is able to silence the media if and
only if  (n) > a: That is, for a media outlet, the benet of being the one to break news
must be less than the benet of receiving an interview with the prime minister when all
the other media outlets have been granted an interview as well. Thus we have:
Proposition 7 The media industry is captured if and only if  (n) > a.
As  is decreasing in n, the risk of capture is reduced, as in the baseline model, when
the number of media outlets increases. With low media concentration, being one of the
many outlets with an exclusiveinterview with the prime minister is less attractive than
being the only one to report an important piece of negative news. This analysis conrms
that the basic idea of the analysis works for a wider class of inuences on the media than
pure bribery.
20Reich [26] contends that the current US admistration has received mostly positive coverage from the
media also because Bushs White House press operation has been one of the most disciplined and e¤ective
in American history - rewarding friendly reporters with access and scoops, freezing out unfriendly ones.
21The presence of a cost of granting interviews would make the e¤ect of plurality stronger.
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4 Conclusions
The main contribution of this paper is to study the political economy of media capture.
The model developed here produces a number of predictions on the relationship between
features of the media industry, media capture and political outcomes that are consistent
with cross-country facts.
Studying the role of the media in achieving government accountability gives a sense of
why regulatory issues for the media sector go beyond standard competition policy concerns.
Changes in the concentration level or in the ownership structure may a¤ect welfare, not
only through the traditional channel of consumer surplus (subscription prices, advertising
rates, etc...), but also through e¤ects on political accountability. A potential innovation in
the media industry such as the privatization of a state broadcaster, a relaxation of rules on
private or foreign ownership, or a merger among hitherto separate media companies must
also be evaluated on the basis of its e¤ect on the ability of the government to inuence
news production to its advantage. The model suggests two such dimensions. First,
does a regulatory reform increase or decrease the number of independent news producers?
Second, does it increase or decrease the transaction cost between the government and the
outlets involved?
The analysis also sheds new light on the role of regulatory bodies. A recent OECD
meeting of national regulators expressed a general consensus that media pluralism is of
paramount importance but concluded that: Competition authorities are often reluctant
to include pluralism considerations in merger reviews or even advise concerning them.
This reluctance is sometimes explained by referring to measurement di¢ culties, and a lack
of synergies in terms of the expertise required to assess economic and pluralism e¤ects.
There are also concerns to safeguard a competition authoritys independence from political
pressure and to preserve its reputation for objectivity and even-handed dealings.(OECD
[22]) Enabling regulators to act as an e¤ective safeguard of media independence requires
an operational criterion to evaluate the danger of capture and institutional protection
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against political pressure.
The analysis developed here is simple and much remains to be done to obtain a com-
plete picture of the issues that arise in thinking about the medias role in modern societies
from an economic point of view. It would be interesting, in particular, to relax the as-
sumption that the media produce only hard information. In practice, journalists often
possess information from uno¢ cial sources (as in the Watergate scandal) or personal im-
pressions. When presented with unveriable information, readers must decide whether to
believe it. This requires a dynamic model of reputation formation among media outlets.
A rst move in this direction is suggested by Gentzkow and Shapiro [14] who prove that
prot-maximizing media outlets may slant their news towards readersprior beliefs in order
to appear more credible. However, an increase in media competition reduces bias.
Our model of capture has focused on media bias that is induced by political capture.
However, three recent papers have shown that bias can come from other sources: reputa-
tional concerns of the media (the above cited Gentzkow and Shapiro [14]), a conrmatory
cognitive bias of readers (Mullainathan and Shleifer [21]), and an ideological bias of re-
porters (Baron [2]). In the last two cases, concentration may have the opposite e¤ect
compared to the present paper and to Gentzkow and Shapiro: an increase in the number
of independent media outlets can actually lead to an increase in the level of bias.22
But the main message remains clear. The formal safeguards of media freedom en-
shrined in law are no guarantee of a media sector that is free from political interference.
Understanding the potential distortions that can arise in the behavior of the media and
what makes them more prevalent is of both theoretical and practical interest.
22A previous version of this paper, available on request, extends the model to allow for ideologically-
motivated newspapers and voters. It shows that ideological polarization in the media may reduce capture
by making it more expensive for the incumbent to silence the whole media industry (provided that voters
are exible in their choice of media).
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Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
The equilibrium strategies and beliefs are:
1. Voters believe
Pr ( = g) =
8<: 0 if s = b if s = ?
2. Voters vote for the challenger if s = b and re-elect the incumbent if s = ?.
3. Outlet i accepts ti if and only if ti  a.23
4. The incumbent o¤ers ti = a to all outlets if: (a) outlets have observed s = b; (b)
na  r. The incumbent o¤ers 0 to all outlets otherwise.
It is easy to check that this is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the baseline game.
We now prove that this is the unique pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in
which voters do not play weakly dominated strategies (PSPBEW).
Begin with voter behavior. The only information voters receive is the signal s. Thus,
their strategy can only be conditioned on s. Kicking out the incumbent if s = b is a strictly
dominant strategy. The only question is whether there can be a pure-strategy equilibrium
in which the incumbent is kicked out if s = ;. But this is impossible because if that were
the case, the incumbent would not suppress information and hence the posterior when the
voters observe s = ; would be strictly greater than , and voters should actually re-elect
the incumbent whenever they observe s = ;. Thus, in every PSPBEW the incumbent is
re-elected if and only if s = ;.
Now, consider the interaction between the incumbent and the outlets. We show that in
every PSPBEW an informed outlet accepts ti > a and rejects ti < a. First, the commercial
23Technically, we should also specify the belief of outlet i on the o¤ers made to other outlets, but this
is not necessary because the reasoning below shows that the equilibrium strategy is essentially unique.
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revenue of i cannot be higher than a. Thus, in any equilibrium i must accept o¤ers above
a. Second, given any reply function on the part of outlets, in equilibrium the incumbent
buys o¤ either all the informed outlets or none of them. Suppose that there exists an
equilibrium in which i accepts an o¤er strictly below a. This must be an equilibrium in
which all outlets are silenced. But then, if i rejects the o¤er, it is the only outlet to break
news and he gets a: a contradiction.24
The fact that outlets accept ti > a and rejects ti < a means that in every PSPBEW
the incumbent silences the media if na < r and does not silence them if na > r.
We have thus shown that in every PSPBEW, players behave as in the equilibrium
discussed above (with the proviso that if na = r, the incumbent may or may not silence
the media).
Proof of Proposition 3
The ambiguity in the turnover e¤ect is explained in the text. For voter welfare observe
that
W 0(q) = (1  )

( 1 + 	0(y^(q))q) dy^
dq
+	(y^(q))

= (1  )

	0(y^)(1 	0(y^)q)
	00(y^)q
+	(y^(q))

= (1  )
 
(	0(y^))2 q(1  )
	00(y^)q
+	(y^(q))
!
> 0;
where the third equality is due to the rst order condition for the incumbent. The e¤ect
on expected rent is conrmed by observing that R0 (q) =  W 0 (q).
24The result that in every PSPBEW an informed outlet accepts ti > a and rejects ti < a holds also
if the incumbents o¤ers are observed by all outlets. The line of reasoning above is entirely independent
from the information that outlets have about transfers made to other outlets. Therefore, a PSPBEW of
a game with o¤ers that are public among outlets is identical to the equilibrium discussed above.
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Proof of Proposition 4
Stages 1, 2, and 3, are as in proof of Proposition 1. For stage 0, hold the entry choices
of the other broadcasters xed. Suppose that exactly m   1 broadcasters are entering.
If m  r
a
, an additional broadcaster who enters receives expected revenue qa. Thus he
enters if and only if c  qa (and we assumed qa > c). If instead m > r
a
, the expected
revenue is qa
m
, and the broadcaster enters if c  qa
m
. In this case, the equilibrium number of
entrants is m = mod
 
qa
c

. If mod
 
qa
c

< r
a
, then, when m  1 = mod   r
a

, an additional
broadcaster would get a negative revenue by entering, and the equilibrium m is mod
 
r
a

.
If mod
 
qa
c

> r
a
, then the equilibrium m is mod
 
qa
c

.
It is also easy to see that this is the only pure-strategy equilibrium of the entry game.
Proof of Proposition 5
Formally, the timing of the game is as follows:
1. Broadcasters choose their qs and incur cost q. Without loss of generality, index
them in order of decreasing q.
2. The incumbents type  2 fb; gg is realized (Pr( = g) = ). The di¢ culty  is
realized. Broadcaster i observes signal
si =
8<: b if  = b and   qi; otherwise :
The incumbent observes  and selects a transfer ti  0, for each broadcaster i.
3. Broadcaster i observes ti and decides to accept or reject it. If he accepts, he reports
s = ; and receives ti. If he rejects, he reports the true signal. Signals cannot be
fabricated.
4. Voters observe the signals reported by broadcasters and vote for the incumbent or a
challenger of unknown type.
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The following is a pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium. M = mod
 
r
a

and let
q^(k) be the unique q such that c0(q) = a
k
.
1. Broadcaster i selects qi = q^(1) if i M and qi = q^(i) otherwise.
2. If the signal is good or   qM+1 or  > q1, the incumbent o¤ers no transfers. If
the signal is bad and  2 (qM+1; q1], the incumbent o¤ers a transfer ti = a to all
informed broadcasters.
3. An informed broadcaster accepts a transfer ti if and only if ti  a.
4. Voters re-elect the incumbent if and only if s = ;.
It is immediate to check that 2, 3, and 4 are best responses. Given 2, 3, and 4, we
now check point 1. Let (q^1; :::; q^n) be the strategies of the n outlets according to point 4.
Holding the other qs xed, we consider a deviation qi 6= q^i by player i. For j = 1; :::; n, let
k(j) =
8<: j if j M + 11 if j M :
The payo¤ to an informed outlet, if m outlets are informed is then written as a
k(j)
.
Given , let w () be the highest j 6= i such that   q^j. Then, given a realization ,
the payo¤ of i given qi is
r (qi; ) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if qi < 
a
k(w()+1)
if qi   and w () < i
a
k(w())
if qi   and w () > i
:
This is because, if i is informed and w () < i, the informed outlets are 1; :::; w () plus
outlet i. If instead i is informed but w () > i, the informed outlets are 1; :::; i; :::; w ().
The expected prot of i if he chooses qi is
R 1
0
r (qi; ) d. To prove that a deviation is
not protable we examine @
@qi
R 1
0
r (qi; ). But notice that
R 1
0
r (qi; ) d =
R qi
0
r (qi; ) d,
and, because of the form of r, @
@qi
R qi
0
r (qi; ) = r (qi; qi)
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We shall show that r (qi; qi)  0 whenever qi > q^i and r (qi; qi)  0 whenever qi < q^i.
The former is true because, if qi > q^i (note that by denition qi 2 (q^w(qi)+1; q^w(qi)]),
r (qi; qi) =
a
k (w (qi) + 1)
= c0
 
q^w(qi)+1
  c0 (qi) :
(This happens because an attempt by i to increase qi above, say, q^i 2 would bring it in an
segment of  where news gathering if protable if there are at most i  3 outlets, but now
there are i  2 and the additional monitoring cost does not cover the additional prot).
The latter is true because, if qi < q^i,
r (qi; qi) =
a
k (w (qi))
= c0
 
q^w(qi)
  c0 (qi) :
(Conversely, reducing qi below q^i is a bad idea because this is a segment of  where the
additional monitoring cost is lower than the additional prot).
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5 Additional Material: A Model with Market Seg-
mentation
The baseline model assumed that all voters are informed if there is at least one informative
outlet. This may be unrealistic because it presupposes that people are willing to switch
to a di¤erent outlet if their usual outlet does not have interesting news. The goal of the
present section is to consider a more general model where some viewers are exible (they
are willing to switch to a di¤erent media source) and some are not. We also generalize the
model to allow for heterogeneity among outlets in the strength of the commercial motive
(we replace a with ai) and in the transaction costs (we replace  with  i). Finally, we
now allow the possibility that the government censors the media as well as buying silence
through voluntarycapture.
5.1 Model
The setting is as in the baseline case, except for the following changes:
Politicians: As before, politicians may o¤er bribes ftigni=1 to outlets. However, now
there is an outlet-specic transaction cost  i out of a bribe of ti, the outlet receives ti= i.
We take this transactions cost to be an exogenous feature of the institutional environment
embedded in legal, ownership or regulatory structures. A higher  i corresponds to it being
harder to bribe the media. With probability 1  , the politician nds a way of silencing
the media without o¤ering a bribe (e.g. direct censorship).
The incumbent still cares about holding o¢ ce: she gets r if she is re-elected and zero
otherwise. However, now this benet r is a random variable with support [0;1) and
cumulative distribution function F .
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Voters There is a continuum of voters V = [0; 1] with homogeneous preferences (but
possibly heterogeneous information). They choose whether to re-elect the incumbent or
a random challenger who is good with probability .
We divide voters in into two classes: a proportion 1 ' has a preferred outlet and buys
it if and only if it carries informative news (inexible viewers), while a proportion ' will
buy any outlet as long as it carries informative news (exible viewers). As we shall see
below, the proportion of exible viewers is an important determinant of media capture.25
Media As in the baseline case, there is an exogenous probability q that all outlets become
informed if the incumbent is bad.
Each outlet i is characterized by a natural market share i (with
P
i i = 1). The idea
of a natural market share is a simple way of bringing in issues of concentration. It can
be interpreted as reecting some underlying characteristic of a outlet which is attractive
to some viewers and is xed for the purposes of this analysis. We take it as xed for the
purpose of our analysis. However, clearly it is variable over the longer term, with entry
and exit of outlets.
As in the baseline model, the payo¤of a media outlet depends on the number of viewers
it attracts multiplied by a factor which we call the commercial motive. However, now
this fact is outlet-specic, and it is denoted by ai for outlet i.
Putting this together, we can compute the expected payo¤ to outlet i when there is a
set J of informative outlets. This is:
i =
8<: ai

(1  ')i + ' iP
j =2J j

if i 2 J
0 if i =2 J
(1)
If outlet i carries informative news, then it attracts all of its own inexible viewers and a
25One might further complicate the problem by assuming that some voters do not read newspapers
or that some voters always read the same newspapers whether or not it carries informative news. The
presence of these groups would make it easier for the incumbent to keep the electorate uninformed (but
it would not add much to the analysis because their behavior is somewhat similar to inexible viewers).
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share of the exible voters depending on how many other outlets are carrying news. For
example, if it is the only outlet with news, then it gets all of the exible voters.
Timing
1. The incumbent is in power and her type is . If  = b, with probability q all outlets
acquire a veriable signal yi = b. Otherwise, they all observe non-veriable signal
yi = ;. With probability 1  , all outlets are censored.
2. The random variable r, distributed on [0;1) according to CDF F , is realized and
observed. The incumbent observes the vector of signals fyigi=1;:::;n and can propose
bribes ftigi=1;:::;n.
3. outlet i knows what signals the other outlets have observed and it accepts or rejects
the bribe ti. If it accepts the bribe, it reports ~yi = ;, if it rejects the bribe it reports
~yi = b.
4. Voter v chooses which outlet to select according to his type (exible, inexible) and
his market segment. A voter who chooses outlet i observes ~yi. Voter v casts his vote
for the incumbent or the challenger. The candidate who wins the election is in power
for the second term.
As there is a continuum of voters, we should expect multiple perfect Bayesian equilibria.
For analytic simplicity, we choose to focus on sincere voting: each voter computes the
posterior probability that the incumbent is good, ^. If ^ > , he votes for the incumbent.
If ^ < , he votes for the challenger.26
26This is not an innocuous assumption: we should expect better political accountability with pivotal
voting, because uninformed voters have an incentive to abstain (or cast their ballot at random). For a
discussion of the di¤erence between sincere voting and pivotal voting in political economy models of the
media, see Prat and Stromberg [23].
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5.2 Capture
To bribe a media outlet, the incumbent must o¤er to compensate it for any prots that it
forgoes by remaining silent. The minimized cost for a bad politician of buying su¢ cient
media silence to gain re-election is given in:27
Proposition 8 There is a sincere equilibrium where the minimum cost for a bad incum-
bent to be re-elected is:
C = min
J
 
(1  ')
X
i2J
ai ii + '
X
i2J
ai iiP
j =2J j + i
!
(2)
subject to X
i2J
i  min

1;
1
2 (1  ')

 s: (3)
Proof. Begin with Stage 4. Given sincere voting, each voter uses the information he
has to construct a posterior ^ of the probability that the candidates type is g and votes
for the incumbent if and only if ^  . Conjecture that viewers observe each of the two
possible signal realizations with positive probability (we will check later that this belief
is correct in equilibrium). Then it must be that ^ (~yi = b) <  < ^ (~yi = ;). This means
that if y = ; the incumbent is always re-elected and if y = b the incumbent is re-elected if
and only if at least half of the viewers observe ~y = ;.
At stage 3, suppose that outlet i has been o¤ered ti and it conjectures that a subset J
of outlets (including himself) will suppress their signal. His payo¤ is
i =
8<: ai

(1  ')i + ' iP
j =2J j+i

if he rejects
ti
 i
if he accepts
Thus he accepts if and only if
ti  ai i
 
(1  ')i + ' iP
j =2J j + i
!
27As in the rest of the paper, we focus on pure-strategy equilibria.
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The total cost of suppressing the signal for subset J is thus
(1  ')
X
i2J
ai ii + '
X
i2J
ai iiP
j =2J j + i
At stage 2, the incumbent chooses between leaving the media free or making sure that half
of the voters are silenced. If he silences a subset J the proportion of viewers who observe
; is 8<: (1  ')
P
j2J j if J  N
1 if J = N
In order to suppress information for at least half of the voters, the incumbent must choose
J such that either X
j2J
j  1
2 (1  ')
or J = N . In concise form, we can writeX
j2J
j  min

1;
1
2 (1  ')

(4)
Thus, the cost minimization problem of an incumbent who wants to suppress the signal is
as in the statement of the Proposition.
To understand Proposition 8, note that the equilibrium cost of silencing outlet i is
equal to the additional prot that the outlet would receive if it were to carry informative
news instead:
(1  ') aii + 'ai iP
j =2J j + i
:
The rst additional term is the forgone revenue from inexible viewers. The second addi-
tional term, is the forgone revenue from (potential) exible viewers: if the outlet deviates
and rejects the incumbents o¤er, it gets a share of exible viewers equal to its initial share
i boosted by a factor 1P
j =2J j+i
that depends on the total share of outlets that are not
silenced. The cost of capture is simply the summation over all outlets that are silenced in
equilibrium.
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The constraint represents the requirement that at least 50% of viewers stay uninformed.
If '  1=2, the incumbent needs to buy out the whole media industry. If instead ' < 1=2,
then she only needs to buy out a set of outlets that covers a share of (initial) viewership
greater or equal than 1
2(1 ') . If all viewers are inexible, then buying a share s
 = 1
2
is
su¢ cient.
It is clear from (2) what factors go into making it more costly to capture the media.
First, it is more costly to capture the media when there is more commercialization as
represented by higher ai and higher levels of commercialization as represented by  i. More
voter exibility also makes it more expensive to buy o¤ the media it means that a greater
market share needs to be bought. Also an increase in ' results in a greater cost of capture.
We summarize these results in:
Proposition 9 The cost of capture C is an increasing function of the proportion of exi-
ble viewers ', and a non-decreasing function of the transaction cost  i and the commercial
motive ai of each outlet i.
The comparative static on concentration is now more complicated. Let us restrict
attention to settings where the transaction cost and the commercial motive is the same
for all outlets: ai = a and  i =  for all i. We distinguish two cases, according to whether
'  0:5.
If the proportion of exible viewers is at least 50%, the analysis is simple. A bad
incumbent must buy out all outlets in order to guarantee re-election (s = 1). The cost of
capture in expression (2) boils down to
C = a (1  '+ 'n) ;
which is a linear function of the number of outlets. Hence, the situation is very similar
to the baseline result. Indeed, if ' = 1, the cost of capture is exactly the same as in
Proposition 1, namely an.
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If the proportion of exible viewers is below 50%, the relationship between media
concentration and cost of capture is more complex. To make the problem tractable, we
make a further simplication: initial shares are identical across outlet, i = 1n . Then, a
decrease in concentration is just an increase in n. The cost of capture becomes
C = a

(1  ') m
n
+ '
m
n m+ 1

;
where m  sn.
However, if ' < 0:5, a decrease in concentration may lead to a decrease in the cost of
capture because of integer constraints. For instance, suppose that all viewers are exible
and there is only one outlet. The cost of capture is simply a . However, if the outlet
splits into two equal size outlets, the cost is reduced to 1
2
a . This e¤ect is due solely to
an indivisibility problem. With only one outlet, the incumbent is forced to buy out the
whole outlet.28
Indeed, we can show that the e¤ect disappears if integer constraints are not present.
To see this, assume that we start from a situation where the constrain m  sn is binding
(this is approximately true when n is su¢ ciently large). The cost of capture is
C = a

(1  ') s + ' s
n
(1  s)n+ 1

:
Now the cost of capture is strictly increasing in n unless ' = 0.
To summarize our results on concentration:
Proposition 10 Suppose ai = a and  i =  for all i:
1. If ' 2 1
2
; 1

, the cost of capture is strictly increasing in the number of independent
outlets n;
28This is probably just an artifact of the model. In practice, the incumbent and the newspaper could
reach a mutually benecial agreement whereby the paper nds a way of reducing its readership to less
than 50%.
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2. Suppose ' 2  0; 1
2

, i = 1n for all i, and the constraint (3) is binding. Then, the
cost of capture is non-decreasing in the number of independent outlets n.
The higher is the proportion of exible viewers, the closer we are to the baseline model.
Only in the case where all viewers are inexible (' = 0) does a decrease in concentration
not increase the cost of capture.
5.3 Political Outcome
To determine whether the media is captured, the incumbent (if she is bad) compares the
cost of silencing the media with the stochastic rent r from holding o¢ ce in period two.
The media is captured when the rent is high. Thus, we have:
Proposition 11 Suppose that voting is sincere. Then
(i) The probability that a bad incumbent is revealed to voters is
E = qF (C)
(ii) Expected turnover is
T = (1  ) q (1  )F (C)
and
(iii) Expected voter welfare is
U = (2 + (1  ) (q (1  )F (C))) 
The last result shows that the results described in Proposition 2 for the baseline case
extend to this more complex set-up. Voter information, political turnover, and voter
welfare are all increasing functions of the cost of capture, and hence, by Propositions 9
and 10, of transaction cost, commercial motive, and (with the proviso discussed above)
concentration.
Moreover, political outcomes also depend, in an unsurprising way, on the monitoring
technology (q) and on direct censorship ().
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Low State 
Ownership of 
Newspapers  
High State 
Ownership of 
Newspapers  
Difference 
between 
columns (1) and 
(2) – standard 
error in 
parentheses 
Low 
Concentration in 
Ownership of 
Newspapers 
High 
Concentration in 
Ownership of 
Newspapers 
Difference 
between 
columns (4) and 
(5) – standard 
error in 
parentheses 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years in office of 
chief executive 
5.23     12.44 7.21
(1.82) 
5.33 
 
10.79 5.46
(1.78) 
Corruption       2.41 3.66 1.24
(0.26) 
2.36 3.51 1.16
(0.25) 
 
Notes:  (1)  All data are computed for  a consistent sample of 88 countries for which all data are available – which is essentially the 
sample in Djankov et al (2004).  (2)  The number of years in office of the chief executive (typically Prime Minister or President) is 
taken from Beck et al (2000) and denotes the value as in 1997.  The mean of this variable in our sample is 7.44 with a standard 
deviation of 8.53. (3) The corruption measure is from the International Country Risk Guide for 2001.  The variable is measured on a 
seven point scale (0-6) where the highest level of corruption is 6.  The mean of this variable in our sample is 2.79 and the standard 
deviation is 1.28.  (4)  The measure of state ownership and concentration is from Djankov et al (2004).  Low state ownership is 
defined as the state owning less than 30% of the market share among the top five newspapers in each country.  The mean of state 
ownership of newspapers is 29.6%.  Concentration of ownership is a dummy variable equal to one if the top five outlets own more 
than 75% of the newspaper market regardless of the form of ownership.  39% of the sample of 88 countries in our sample are 
classified as concentrated by this measure. 
 
 
Table 1:  The Relationship between state ownership, concentration, turnover and corruption. 
